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3.1  introduction 
Recent bouts of economic instability, originating in overexpansion and end- 
ing in hyperinflation, led economists to describe regimes in power during the 
past decade in Latin America as populist. Certainly Sarney, Alfonsin, Garcia 
and  the Sandinistas  have  overseen  inflation  caused  by  budget  deficits  and 
balance-of-payments crises. The macroeconomic imbalances of these govern- 
ments show strong similarities with  the economic record  of Peron,  Vargas, 
and Goulart, three leaders traditionally identified as populists. Yet one should 
think twice about generalizing the term. Although recent regimes have failed 
to  rein  in  budget  deficits,  the  economic  strategies  they  pursued  and  their 
underlying motivations display considerable heterogeneity  and are quite dis- 
tinct from past populism. This paper discusses these differences. 
Why debate terminology? There are lessons that recent leaders should have 
learned from traditional populists.  The most basic is that failure to adjust to 
constraints imposed by the balance of payments and the internal productive 
capacity  will  lead to inflation  and disaster (Harberger  1970). Yet,  the early 
warning signs, evident in rhetoric and specific policies, have varied widely. If 
we broadly identify the disease and lump, ex post, all inflationary failures into 
the category of populism, we will not understand ex ante the development of 
crises and avert them. Moreover, because populism is associated with redistri- 
bution (although not toward the poorest),  it is important to clarify when and 
why redistribution can lead to inflation. 
We begin by describing classical populism, as it has been viewed by Latin 
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Americanists over the past four decades (Archetti, Cammack, and Roberts 
1987) and use the Argentine experience between 1945-52  to illustrate it. We 
then describe the new  economic concept of  populism, put  forth by  Sachs 
(1989), Dornbusch (1988), and Dornbusch and Edwards (1989). Their analy- 
ses stress the repeated willingness of Latin American regimes to push demand 
beyond economic bounds. We  then examine specific cases of populism dis- 
cussing the diversity of situations. We  emphasize that there are at least three 
distinct roots of inflationary finance: 
. 
excessive optimism about the potential for rapid growth through demand 
stimulation and inward-looking industrialization, as seen in the Peruvian 
experience under Garcia; 
market-based socialism, which causes insecure property rights and triggers 
intervention from the United States and larger defense budgets, as observed 
in Nicaragua in the 1980s; 
the inability to impose the burden of contractionary adjustment on various 
groups, as in Brazil after the oil shock and debt crisis. 
Far from providing a compelling indictment of  redistribution efforts, the 
history of populism makes conspicuous the paucity of genuine redistribution 
programs in Latin America. Most regimes failed to target the poor.  Urban 
workers in the informal sector did not benefit from populist increases in the 
minimum wage, nor did social programs concentrate resources on the indi- 
gent. The rural poor suffered both from a deterioration in agriculture’s terms 
of trade and a failure to implement land reform with adequate credit and tech- 
nical assistance. 
3.2  Classical Populism 
Social scientists (Baily 1967; Conniff 1982; Germani 1978; Hamilton 1980; 
Hennessy  1976; Malloy 1977; and Stein 1980) traditionally associate popu- 
lism with policies pursued by Per&  in Argentina between 1946 and 1949, by 
Vargas in Brazil after 1945, by Cardenas in Mexico between 1934 and 1940, 
and by Velasco in Peru between 1968 and 1975. 
We  refer to these episodes as classical populism, an urban political tradition 
that opposed the primary-product-export-oriented status quo of the nineteenth 
century and endorsed accelerated industrial development. It constructed alli- 
ances linking the working class to the industrial bourgeoisie and minimized 
interclass antagonisms through the propagation of  a broadly nationalist ide- 
Classical populism favored activist governments committed to a strong role 
in price determination,  to protection of  workers and wages, to policies of 
cheap food, to state ownership of key industries, to state allocation of  credit 
at low interest rates, and to favors for private industry. It rejected any appeal 
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to the need for overall restraints on spending. The consequences were an ex- 
tensive growth of government relative to the private sector and the pervasive- 
ness of  corruption in  varied  forms, including  tax  evasion.  Growing budget 
deficits resulted  in rising dependence on foreign savings. Import substitution 
associated  with trade restrictions  resulted  in dependence on foreign capital. 
The urban bias  of  economic policy  and resource  allocation  resulted in dra- 
matic rural poverty. 
Economists and political scientists from right and left have emphasized the 
negative sides of populism. The right attacks populists as demagogues who 
fuel inflation,  frighten capital, and provoke political instability.  The left ac- 
cuses them of  betraying the masses.  But it was not part of populist programs 
to carry out a social revolution,  as in Allende’s Chile or Ortega’s Nicaragua. 
Populists hoped to reform the system, not to overthrow it. Their program was 
to deliver economic growth based on industrialization as the path to sustained 
employment. Overwhelmed by their mistakes, we now tend to forget the suc- 
cessful  role  played  by  import-substitution  industrialization  (ISI)  in  Latin 
American extravagant growth rates, which averaged more than 5 percent per 
year between 1950 and 1980 (table 3.1). It is worthwhile asking whether there 
were viable alternatives to the populist import-substitution industrialization of 
the  1940s and 1950s. Right-wing, coercive regimes in the 1970s did not pro- 
vide political development, economic growth, and social justice. Neither did 
socialist governments. 
IS1 was the pragmatic answer to the problems following the Great Depres- 
sion of the 1930s and the disruption of the Second World War. Later, structur- 
alists, cepalists, reformists, and developmentalists  conceived  the economic 
models that justify the import-substitution  strategy pointing to the inadequacy 
of  market  mechanisms  alone  to achieve  industrialization  (Prebisch  1976; 
Singer 1984). They built their arguments on two pillars: 
They called  attention  to the foreign  exchange constraint  as  an  important 
determinant of  growth. In a world where the terms of trade moved against 
traditional  primary export products,  domestic production  would  have  to 
substitute for nonessential imports, freeing foreign exchange for the needed 
inputs. Moreover, while technical progress in agriculture would leave labor 
unemployed, industry could absorb the growing population with increasing 
productivity and incomes. Expanding domestic production required protec- 
tion against imports. 
In the microeconomic sphere, they stressed imperfections and discontinui- 
ties, both  of  which  impeded effective operation of price signals. Whether 
in  agriculture,  where  land  concentration  was  notorious,  or  in  industry, 
where new privileges provided shelter from market forces, the competitive 
model was flawed. 
These conditions supported a  strong  state presence. Development  was  a 
consequence of  policy, not the result of  natural evolution (Cardoso and Fish- 48  Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege 
Table 3.1  Per Capita Gross Domestic Output and Growth Rates of Latin 
American Countries’ 
Growth Rate of 
Share in Total  GDP per Capita  GDP per Capita 
(1975 Dollars)  (% per year)  Population, 
1980 
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dLatin  America except Cuba. 
low 1992). Such a model made sense but was far from perfect. It downplayed 
the market role and confronted three limitations: 
. 
Protection led to overvalued exchange rates and hence to an eventual reduc- 
tion in the export supply. Industrialization in turn required increased inputs 
of capital goods and intermediate imports. As trade deficits increased, for- 
eign capital flows became vital,  an ironic consequence of a strategy deriv- 
ing its strong political appeal from its emphasis upon national  productive 
capability. 
In sectoral terms, import substitution policies exaggerated industrial growth 
at the expense of agriculture.  Moreover,  relatively capital intensive manu- 
factures absorbed only a fraction of the increment in the labor force, placing 
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Finally, as the  resources taxed  away  from primary  exports failed  to  in- 
crease, subsidies to industrial investment and growing government respon- 
sibilities put new pressures upon the budget. Monetization of the deficit led 
to persistent inflation. 
The distributive agenda of populism called for an increase in urban incomes 
at the expense of rural producers, exporters, and foreign capital. Velasco and 
Czirdenas promoted agrarian reforms in Peru and Mexico, but their credit and 
price policies favored the  urban  sectors.  Specific policies included higher 
minimum wages, price controls on food, and protectionist barriers. While the 
urban working class served as a primary constituency, domestic industrialists 
also supported Peron, Vargas, and Velasco. 
The classical populist agenda of redistribution was not sustainable for the 
same reasons that IS1 failed in the end. Protectionism did not raise real pro- 
ductivity to create a basis for large gains in urban wages. Nor did tax collec- 
tions grow enough to finance government subsidization of  the industrializa- 
tion process. Inelasticity of supply in the agricultural and export sectors was 
overestimated: it did not take long for overvalued exchange rates and price 
controls to cause stagnation in these sectors. Alienation of foreign capital ex- 
acerbated problems. In the absence of a major boom in export prices, classical 
populism rapidly self-destructed. 
The most representative populist was Peron. He came to power in  1946 by 
building a base of  support among unions as Argentina’s secretary of  labor 
between 1943 and 1945. Peron promoted the vision of a rapidly industrializ- 
ing Argentina, free of foreign influence. 
Wages rose rapidly as Peron’s government settled strikes in favor of  work- 
ers: real wages rose 25 percent in 1947 and 24 percent in 1948 (Skidmore and 
Smith 1984). Labor’s share of  income rose from 40 percent in  1946 to 49 
percent in 1949. Social security benefits expanded dramatically (Mesa-Lago 
1978). What  made this rapid  redistribution possible without an  immediate 
collapse of the economy was the boom in Argentina’s export prices after the 
Second World  War.  Export revenues more than doubled between  1945 and 
1948, although volume remained roughly the same (Rock  1975). Industry 
grew markedly faster than agricultural growth. Control of the state marketing 
board  for agricultural output enabled the government to keep  food  prices 
down and reap a surplus from exports. Despite high world prices, agricultural 
income declined 27 percent between 1946 and 1949. Peron’s strong national- 
ist streak led to nationalization of the railroads, the telephone system, and the 
ck facilities, with ample compensation of foreign firms. 
Problems emerged in 1949. Argentina’s terms of trade deteriorated sharply 
as adjustment in postwar Europe curtailed the region’s ability to import food 
and U.S. agricultural protectionism excluded Argentine goods. The trade bal- 
ance turned from surplus to deficit. Reserves disappeared. Complicating the 
situation was the adoption of  inconvertible currencies by  Argentina’s trade 
partners.  “Europe could not pay; the United States would not buy”  (Fodor SO  Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege 
1975, p. 150). Exchange rate policy and low prices paid by  the agricultural 
marketing  board  exacerbated the consequences of  unfavorable  shifts in the 
world economy. 
Internally, expansion had gone well beyond what could be financed by ag- 
ricultural  surpluses. The money  supply  was  increasing  rapidly  in  order to 
finance  industrialization.  Inflation  doubled  to  31  percent  in  1949.  Perh 
launched a stabilization program, tightened credit, cut government spending, 
and capped wage and price increases. He offered incentives to agriculture and 
made overtures to foreign capital. A severe drought in 1950/51 forced further 
adjustment. 
The multiclass, nationalist alliance needed high growth to sustain political 
viability. After 1952, “the state’s adjudicatory role in the economy ceased to 
be a matter of  allocating relatively higher rates of  return to one group or an- 
other in the midst of an expanding surplus. Economic recession meant that its 
role became more coercively redistributive” (Rock 1975, p. 191). The govern- 
ment  became  increasingly  authoritarian  to  force  adjustment  on  various 
groups. Growing levels of  violence  and social tension  preceded  a military 
takeover in 1955. 
3.3  Economic Populism 
Recent economic literature argues that populist policies like those of Peron 
were repeated  in the 1980s, leading to similar crises.  Two excellent articles 
spell out a new,  economic definition of  populism.  Dornbusch  and Edwards 
(1989) define populism as an “approach to economics that emphasizes growth 
and income redistribution  and deemphasizes the risks of  inflation and deficit 
finance, external constraints and the reaction of economic agents to aggressive 
non-market  policies.”  The belief  in excess capacity  sets up the expectation 
that  government deficits  and higher  real  wages  are feasible.  Governments 
avoid  devaluations  because  of  their  distributive  consequences.  As  higher 
wages go into effect, the economy responds  with more rapid growth, but it 
does so by running down inventories  and foreign reserves.  Bottlenecks  be- 
come binding constraints and inflation takes off. The failure to reverse redis- 
tributive efforts leads into growing government deficits, balance of payments 
problems and pervasive shortages. The collapse of the economy makes work- 
ers worse off than they were at the beginning of the populist period. 
In a similar vein, Sachs (1989) blames much of Latin America’s inflation 
on attempts to implement redistributive policies. In an insightful analysis, he 
argues that Latin America’s high level of  income inequality creates political 
pressure to pursue bad macroeconomic policies.  In an environment  of  high 
social conflict, populist  regimes attempt to improve  the lot  of  low  income 
groups, mainly through demand stimulation. The result is a set of unsustain- 
able macroeconomic policies including  government  deficits and overvalued 
exchange rates. What perpetuates the cycle of  populism is that expansionary 51  Populism, Profligacy, and Redistribution 
policies yield favorable results at first. Because leaders have insecure tenure 
in office they adopt short-sighted policies that bring immediate gains to their 
constituencies. 
Both articles argue that the politics of each regime and the specific policies 
are not significant. What needs to be learned is a universally applicable lesson: 
policies must be consistent with the capacity of the economy to generate for- 
eign exchange for imports and savings to finance investment. In the past two 
decades, several Latin American regimes have failed to manage their econ- 
omy within these limits. Nowhere is the sense of d6ja vu stronger than in the 
case of Peru’s once charismatic president, Alan Garcia. 
Garcia took power in 1985 promising growth at 6 percent per year and the 
weakening of the Sendero Luminoso. A demand-driven expansion was set in 
motion. Wages were sharply increased, interest rates cut, and taxes reduced. 
Old style structuralism provided the rationale: inadequate demand prevented 
the economy from reducing costs through economies of scale; low elasticities 
of  supply in the export sector accounted for balance-of-payments problems; 
unemployment and unused industrial capacity implied that the economy could 
grow much faster. 
Policies were nationalistic and inward looking. Garcia increased tariff lev- 
els, imposed restrictions on capital flows and announced that Peru would not 
pay  more than  10 percent of  its export earnings in  debt service. To  control 
inflation, he froze prices and fixed the exchange rate. Like Perch, he intended 
not only to serve labor through higher wages but to raise profits for local in- 
dustrialists through stimulation of demand and increased protectionism. 
The initial results were fantastic. In  1986, inflation dropped to less than 
half its level in the preceding year and growth shot up to 9.5 percent. Strong 
growth continued  in  1987 (at 6.7 percent),  but inflation exploded and  the 
economy moved quickly toward collapse. The public sector deficit had more 
than doubled, from 4.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1985 to 
9.9 percent in 1987 (Dornbusch 1988). As reserves evaporated, Garcia contin- 
ued to raise wages, announcing a generous wage package in April 1987. He 
executed his own coup de grace in late July by nationaiizkg the banks. Indus- 
trialists immediately withdrew their support and social conflict intensified. By 
early 1988, inflation was well over 1,000 percent and output was sliding rap- 
idly. For all intents and purposes, Garcia relinquished control to aides. 
Like Peron, Garcia did not aim at the very poor. Urban wage earners (es- 
pecially  unionized workers and public employees) and domestic capitalists 
were the first to gain. These gains were more distributive than redistributive: 
growth in the size of the pie can benefit all. Initially, the rural sector was hurt 
by  Garcia’s exchange rate policies. As shortages of  foreign exchange devel- 
oped, he allowed peasant prices to rise and made credit more readily available, 
but he never implemented a program to overcome widespread rural poverty. 
Support for the Sendero Luminoso barely wavered. 
If  Perdn  served as the model for populism’s demise, the shoe fit Garcia 52  Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege 
fairly well. Neither was serious enough about redistribution to do it without 
trying to boost growth, and both  were more interested  in distributive issues 
affecting the  politically  powerful  than  the poor.  As Sachs (1989) suggests, 
lack of consensus about income distribution does indeed cause political ten- 
sion, and  policymakers  often  try  to diffuse this  with inflationary  spending. 
The poor, however, are neither part of the political conflict nor prominent in 
the populist solution. Populism lacks a significant role for redistribution. 
Genuine efforts to mitigate poverty do not necessarily  lead to hyperinfla- 
tion: Costa Rica has done fairly well on this score. At the same time, hyper- 
inflationary experiences are not always the result of failed populism. Few au- 
thors would be willing to argue that Martinez de Hoz was a populist, but his 
policies also led to a balance-of-payments crisis and the explosion of inflation 
in Argentina. The easy access to foreign capital enjoyed by the military in the 
late  1970s helped  sustain  bad  policies  and  macro  imbalances.  Argentina’s 
neoconservative experience indicates that even without populist rhetoric, gov- 
ernments are quite capable of pursing polices that fuel inflation and balance- 
of-payments  crises (Ramos 1986). Procapital policies are not a panacea for 
instability,  nor is redistribution  necessarily  to blame for economic misman- 
agement. 
3.3.1  Allende and Ortega: Populists? 
Two socialist  experiences, Allende’s  regime  in  Chile (1970-73)  and  the 
Sandinista era in Nicaragua (1979-90)  have been placed under the broad ru- 
bric of economic populism. Both regimes collapsed as hyperinflation created 
increasingly chaotic economies. Moreover, both governments promoted redis- 
tribution and ran deficits that were the proximate cause of inflation. In the case 
of  Allende, there  was also excessive optimism  about the potential  for eco- 
nomic growth through demand stimulation. Nonetheless, the socialist nature 
of  these  regimes  sets them apart:  their challenge to capitalism vitiated  any 
possibility of building a multiclass alliance and set up strong internal and ex- 
ternal forces determined  to overthrow the regime.  The instability  caused by 
uncertain property  rights and U.S. hostility  figured strongly in the develop- 
ment of macroeconomic imbalances. 
3.3.2  Allende 
When Allende took power in  1970, Chile was already a highly urbanized, 
industrial economy.  Chileans enjoyed the third highest per capita income in 
Latin America. An extensive social welfare system kept extreme poverty  to 
low levels relative to the rest of Latin America.  In contrast to Peron and Var- 
gas, who introduced import-substituting industrialization strategies and social 
welfare legislation, Allende came to power after these had occurred in Chile. 
The economy depended upon imported parts and materials for its heavily pro- 
tected industry, and agriculture had been neglected for decades. Whereas Pe- 
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gram targeted redistribution.  The multiclass base of  Peron’s regime was not 
evident under Allende. Instead, he took power despite strong opposition from 
capitalists. 
Allende’s first step in early  1971 was to increase real minimum wages by 
37-41  percent for blue-collar workers and by 8-10  percent  for white-collar 
workers.  He expanded  housing,  food,  and  educational  assistance:  public- 
housing starts were up twelvefold and eligibility for free milk was extended 
from age 6 to age 15. The government deficit rose from 3 percent to 10 percent 
of GDP (World Bank 1981). 
Initially,  idle capacity,  high copper  prices,  and  large reserves  of  foreign 
exchange helped. Real GDP rose 7.7 percent, and unemployment in Santiago 
fell from 8 to 4 percent in  1971. Industrial output rose sharply as consumer 
demand expanded. The hard currency needed  for this expansion came from 
foreign reserves, a drawing down of inventories and reduced capital imports. 
(Industrialists cut capital imports in part because of wariness about Allende’s 
respect for private property rights.) 
Allende  attempted  to repeat his early success with a new round of wage 
increases in  1972. Real blue-collar wages were increased by 27 percent and 
white-collar wages were fully indexed. But shortages of foreign exchange be- 
came serious, and it was impossible to increase Chileans’ consumption with- 
out sustained copper earnings  and commercial  lending.  Working-class con- 
sumption in Chile was very import-intensive, as both manufactured goods and 
food imports required foreign exchange. The country’s backward agricultural 
sector was in no position to absorb growing demand for food. Eduardo Frei’s 
gradual process of land reform was accelerated: takeovers increased eightfold 
in Allende’s first year. Despite rising  real food prices,  both the area planted 
and output fell. 
Compounding Allende’s problems was a sharp decline in receipts of foreign 
exchange: 
Copper prices fell by a sharp 23 percent in  1971 and did not recover until 
mid-1973, a few months before the coup.  At the time, copper accounted 
for two-thirds  of the country’s export earnings.  Although volume did not 
change markedly, export earnings fell 24 percent, between  1970 and 1972. 
The U.S. government, opposing Allende from the start, contributed to his 
downfall by withdrawing aid, by placing an embargo on exports to Chile, 
and by financing his opponents. Allende’s call to end compensation to for- 
eign  firms  nationalized  in  the  1960s was  a specific basis  for opposition. 
Socialist ideals were the general cause of  antagonism.  Net official capital 
flows from the United States dropped from $172 million in 1969 to -  $198 
million in 1971. Refusal to repay debt restored capital flows to a negligible 
positive amount. Commercial lenders also eliminated their short-term cred- 
its. It is often noted that Allende received more aid from communist coun- 
tries than he lost from Western creditors.  In fact, almost all of this aid was 
granted  for purchases  of  industrial plants and technical  assistance,  which 54  Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege 
Chile did not need. It did not provide spare parts for existing equipment or 
necessary intermediate materials and food. By June 1973, the Chileans had 
taken up only 21 percent of the credits offered by the East Bloc. 
Was Allende a populist? In terms of the new economic definition of popu- 
lism,  three criteria  are met:  he tried redistribution  through wage increases, 
government deficits rose dramatically,  and a balance-of-payments crisis fig- 
ured prominently  in the economy’s collapse.  By more traditional  notions of 
populism,  the case is not  clear. The program never aimed at satisfying both 
capitalists and workers. From the start, it was expected that capitalists would 
gradually  lose.  The regime’s  socialist  agenda  brought  property  rights  into 
question. Workers increasingly demanded that the state take over plants, and 
social tension over property rights turned to near anarchy by the end (Falcoff 
1989). The Allende constituency was distinctly not a multiclass coalition, as 
political scientists so often describe populist regimes. Nor was Allende’s long- 
term strategy to promote capitalist growth with the help of selective state in- 
tervention. The Popular Unity platform explicitly rejected the power of indus- 
trial  monopolists  who had  gained  power during Chile’s import-substitution 
period (Sideri 1979). 
The Popular  Unity  agenda violated  basic  rules  of  good  macroeconomic 
management. Allende’s problems, however, derived also from his willingness 
to  step into the  conflict between  superpowers  and  his challenge  to private 
property rights,  two significant factors that cannot be dismissed.  Of course, 
one can also debate just how socialist the Allende regime was. It never con- 
trolled the legislature enough to implement a dramatic change in the nature of 
production or the structure of social classes. 
3.3.3  The Sandinistas 
The Sandinistas’ downfall resulted from weak economic performance,  but 
they followed a different path from the one chosen by Allende. The Sandinis- 
tas put no stake on demand-driven  growth. They counted the beans in their 
bag and knew that none were magic.  Yet  pursuit of  a redistributive  program 
(as distinct from distribution with growth) caused an unmanageable political 
backlash. 
When  the  Sandinistas  took  power  in  1979, the  rural  sector represented 
roughly half of the economy. The industrial sector employed a smaller propor- 
tion of the labor force than in other Latin American countries. Although some 
basic industries were in place (food processing, cement, fertilizer, and petro- 
leum refining  industries),  there were virtually  no sophisticated assembly op- 
erations.  The Sandinista  strategy did not have to cater to a highly protected 
industrial sector, nor did the program call for import-substituting industriali- 
zation. 
The first years of the revolution brought an energetic attack on urban  and 
rural poverty.  During  Somoza’s last years,  Nicaragua had the highest  child 
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The Somoza regime itself estimated that 60 percent of rural Nicaraguans were 
undernourished. The Sandinistas embarked on a massive literacy campaign, 
construction of  health clinics and schools, extension of  water services, and 
agrarian reform. 
Were there resources to finance these revolutionary programs? Initially, yes. 
Foreign aid was extraordinarily generous during the regime’s first three years. 
Moreover, the government took over land owned by  Somoza and his close 
associates (23 percent of the country’s cultivated land) to initiate its land re- 
form program. Taxes increased from an average of  13 percent of GDP in the 
period 1974-78  to 22 percent in 1980; they peaked at 35 percent in 1984. The 
government deficit, at 8.9 percent of GDP in 1978, stayed at that level through 
1981 and then jumped when Contra activity began in  1982. However, exten- 
sive foreign aid mitigated repercussions from this deficit in the regime’s first 
years (Helwege 1989). 
The  Sandinistas  were  very  careful  to  avoid  across-the-board wage  in- 
creases. The right to strike was tightly controlled and wage increases were 
strongly discouraged as early as  1979 in an effort to contain inflation. The 
hope was  that  a tight lid on wages would help the private sector to slowly 
recover from the destruction caused by  the war.  Inflation was modest in the 
regime’s first years. It was 37 percent in 1980 and dropped down to 12 percent 
in 198  1, 17 percent in 1982, and 11 percent in 1983. It did not get over 100 
percent until 1985. 
What went wrong? Four factors contributed to the Sandinistas’ problems. 
First, socialist rhetoric and threats to expropriate property created enormous 
uncertainty for private producers, who were expected to generate most output. 
Second, world prices of cotton and coffee, which account for about 60 percent 
of  the  country’s export earnings,  fell after  1980. Third,  the currency was 
grossly overvalued as early as 1980. Finally, the war with the Contras, which 
started in 1982, must take most of the blame. 
As a result of civil war, the government deficit soared to 30 percent of GDP 
in 1983 and stayed in the 15-25  percent range thereafter (Ocampo and Taylor 
1989). Half of the government’s budget was devoted to the military, squeezing 
out social spending. The war effort drew scarce resources from the rest of the 
economy. The draft exacerbated labor shortages and export earnings were di- 
verted toward weapons, forcing industry and agriculture to get along without 
imported parts and fertilizers. Rebel attacks also destroyed the transportation 
infrastructure and prevented harvests in the most important agricultural areas 
of the country. 
The war also made distributive issues more critical. Rural peasants could 
not be alienated for fear they would support the Contras. Both in pursuit of 
socialist goals  and for defense reasons,  the  government continued to  give 
peasants title to land and to build schools and health clinics in rural areas as 
budget deficits became unmanageable. 
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ence of large private producers.  They not only brought in most of  the coun- 
try’s hard currency, but they legitimated the government’s claim of respect for 
private property,  blunting  European  support for a full-scale invasion by the 
United States. The government paid dearly for their support. Subsidies to this 
group included a multiple exchange rate system that enabled large producers 
to buy pesticides and fertilizers at low rates while selling export dollars back 
to the government at the parallel rate. Credit was also heavily subsidized. 
Urban  workers  were  the  easiest  to  control.  Although  the  government 
courted  urban  workers  with rhetoric,  their real  wages fell every year  after 
1981 (and they had increased only minimally before that). Shortages of basic 
goods were pervasive in urban areas early on and became worse as the econ- 
omy deteriorated. 
Unable to impose the full burden of defense on any group, the government 
increasingly used the printing press. By  1986 private consumption had fallen 
to roughly one-third of its prerevolution level. For the next three years, Nicar- 
aguans scrambled  to outwit  inflation  by  hoarding  and  speculating,  making 
matters worse. By 1988 inflation had reached  11,500 percent and output had 
fallen back to levels of the late 1960s. 
Populism was not the problem in Nicaragua,  socialism was. It caused too 
much uncertainty about property rights, and it triggered a war that the country 
simply could not afford. Although the Sandinistas ran deficits, the reasons for 
these deficits differed from those one finds in classical populist experiences. 
3.3.4  Brazil: Endless Populism? 
1945 provides a good starting point for discussing politics  in Brazil.  Var- 
gas’s populist reputation is based on the last  10 years of  his political career. 
Having relied on a ruling  coalition of  military elites, coffee exporters, and 
industrialists throughout  the  1930s, Vargas began  to bid  for the  support of 
workers in the  mid-1940s.  In  1942, he instituted  a minimum wage and, in 
1943, a labor code. In  1945, a group of radicals in the Partido Trabalhista 
Brusileiro (PTB) called  for reform  socialism  and  for  special  development 
banks that would provide massive injections of capital in order to broaden the 
internal market for domestic manufactures. This more radical program greatly 
influenced the PTB after Vargas’s reelection in 1950. Vargas moved to the left 
within the framework of restrained militancy of organized labor and state con- 
trol over union  financing. With unions extensively supervised, Brazilian in- 
dustrialists and exporters did not feel threatened and acquired a vested interest 
in the government subsidies and investment policies.  During the decades to 
come, Brazil was to operate under the legacy of her most notorious populist 
leader.  Continuing  expansionist  policies  attenuated  distributional  conflicts 
and blended the interests of business and bureaucracy. 
By  1950 the  easy  phase  of  populist  import-substitution  industrialization 
was over. Adjustment was avoided by violating budget constraints and engen- 
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1958, and Goulart in  1964. When Goulart, trapped in deep economic crisis, 
tried to undertake radical reforms, the military stepped in. National security 
doctrine  provided  the  ideological justification  for intervention  by  claiming 
that the survival of a free society depended on putting an end to the popular 
classes’ resistance to authority. 
The new military government announced a series of policies aimed at re- 
ducing the public-sector deficit, raising taxes, cutting import tariffs, establish- 
ing wage controls and allowing foreign investors easier access. The limits of 
the import substitution strategy were recognized and important modifications 
to commercial policy introduced in the late 1960s. A crawling peg exchange 
rate avoided  the  overvaluation so predominant  earlier.  Explicit concern  for 
inducing nontraditional exports produced special export subsidy programs. In 
the context of a more buoyant international market, such reinforcements pro- 
duced positive results, and export growth and diversification increased. 
Still, the commitment to industrialization remained. And that meant an in- 
trusive role for the public sector even under the “orthodox” policies pursued 
by  military  governments.  Their  administrations  were a clear descendant of 
import substitution, not outward orientation. The large domestic market still 
dominated production decisions and economic austerity did not last long. By 
1974 the populist tradition of accommodation staged a comeback. 
Mounting indebtedness and deterioration of domestic policy in a more dif- 
ficult  external environment  marked  the  post-oil  shock  experience.  Brazil 
chose her adjustment strategy badly, relying upon import-substituting invest- 
ment stimulated by the government rather than upon market-driven responses 
to changes in exchange rates or the relative price of petroleum. External debt 
played a central role: it financed investment and large current account deficits, 
postponing the negative real  income effects of the shock. The strategy  suc- 
ceeded  in  sustaining  high  rates of  growth,  but  the debuexport ratio almost 
doubled.  At the same time, fiscal disequilibria increased as government pur- 
sued its ambitious investment plan.  Even on the eve of the second oil shock, 
Brazil faced the need for a midterm modification of  strategy. But the “reces- 
sionist” proposal of Finance Minister Mario Simonsen yielded to a more am- 
bitious supply-side plan undertaken by Antonio Delfim Netto in 1979. Prior- 
ity  was  given  to  credit  expansion  in  order  to  finance  investment  in  the 
agricultural and energy sectors. Macroeconomic policy was supposed to con- 
tain inflation by reducing interest rates (seen as a significant cost component) 
and by  changing expectations  through preannounced  internal monetary cor- 
rection and exchange rate devaluation. 
Delfim’s “populist”  strategy did not work.  The weakness of  the economy 
only became fully apparent when a new oil price rise, an abrupt increase in 
real interest rates, and an OECD recession coincided in the early 1980s. The 
balance of payments registered a record current account deficit in  1980. The 
inflation rate reached the three-digit level, reflecting excess demand, supply 
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ment lag. In October 1980, a more orthodox package of  fiscal and monetary 
restraint was fashioned and Brazil entered into a period of adjustment through 
recession that was to last until 1983. 
The translation to democracy in 1985 opened the way for popular resistance 
to austerity measures. Sarney brought in a new populist experiment, the Cru- 
zado Plan. The goal was to stop inflation without imposing contraction. With 
prices frozen, the budget was allowed to deteriorate while monetary policy 
turned expansionist. Inflation disappeared temporarily but  new stabilization 
programs were necessary in  1987 and in 1989. Once again, the government 
froze prices and cut zeros off  the face value of  the currency. Promises to elim- 
inate the budget deficit were made but not kept. President Jose Sarney lacked 
the political will to implement measures of fiscal consolidation. 
Was Sarney a populist? He certainly meets all the criteria of the new eco- 
nomic concept of populism. Yet, according to more traditional views, he fell 
short of  the charisma of  a populist leader. The heterodox Cruzado Plan re- 
flected his inability to impose contraction on any constituency, for he lacked 
popular support and allies in the Congress. 
The threat of hyperinflation at the end of 1989 coincided with the presiden- 
tial election that brought Collor to power in March 1990. Collor seems to fit 
the classical description of the populist leader. During his campaign he spoke 
to masses of the poorer sectors of society against the existing institutions of 
the state. His speech had no precise or logically consistent ideology. It ap- 
pealed to alienated or deprived members of  a mass society and directed its 
energy against existing elites. He attacked traditional symbols of prestige in 
the name of popular equality. His populist rhetoric was a collection of strands 
of  both left- and right-wing thought, with a heavy stress on his charismatic 
leadership, often with  a highly illiberal and  intolerant stand on  traditional 
civic liberties. 
His economic program, though, does not fit the new paradigm of economic 
populism. The plan mixes “free-marketeering” and authoritarian intervention: 
In  1989, the government had tried to reduce liquidity through high interest 
rates.  As real  interest rates rose,  so did the cost of  servicing the govern- 
ment’s domestic debt and the debt itself. Because the government debt was 
almost equivalent to cash, high  interest rates only helped to create more 
money. Collor’s plan eliminated the money overhang. After five days during 
which all banks were closed by order, the government blocked a large por- 
tion of  new cruzados in bank accounts-ranging  from checking accounts 
and savings deposits to overnight money-market operations and corporate 
foreign exchange hedges-for  a period of  18 months.’ A monetary reform 
replaced the cruzado novo by  the cruzeiro of  equal value in order to distin- 
guish money that remains in circulation from that which is held in the cen- 
1. Frozen assets will yield monetary correction and 6 percent interest per year. Starting Septem- 
ber 1991, the government will return funds in 12-month installments. 59  Populism, Profligacy, and Redistribution 
tral bank. The central bank estimates that M4 was reduced to one-third its 
previous level. 
The government counts on increased revenues to revert a deficit of 8 percent 
of  GDP into a 2 percent surplus. Part of  the revenue derives from increased 
taxation  on financial  investments.  Elimination  of  unidentified  investors, 
ceilings on bearer checks, and a special income tax declaration for blocked 
funds will  cut down on tax evasion.  Other taxes rose and new ones were 
levied.  For the first time farmers pay taxes.  Fiscal incentives are on hold. 
But increased taxation and a clampdown on evaders might be offset by  the 
decline in economic activity. Some critics also say that the plan did little to 
curb the spendthrift state: closing a few useless federal establishments will 
get rid  of  only a very  small fraction  of  public  employees and the  initial 
privatization program looks timid.2 
According to the new plan, Brazil has opened its borders.  It abolished im- 
port quotas, import licenses, and the list of prohibited items. In their place 
remain tariff barriers.  Export subsidies no longer exist. Port and merchant 
marine surcharges dropped by 50 percent and will disappear in 1991, The 
exchange rate for trade transactions will float. 
The government froze prices for 45 days but prices of the public sector, of 
fuel, electricity,  postage, and telephone calls increased.  Starting in April, 
wages are corrected according to the government-projected  inflation.  For 
April the correction is zero. Many industries have already negotiated with 
workers a 25 percent cut in wages and reduced work hours. 
Collor’s plan combines a liquidity and fiscal squeeze of such austerity that, 
if  it sticks, will not only kill inflation but also create a major recession.  Yet, 
the opinion polls show more than 60 percent support for the president.  Con- 
gress grasped that message and approved the package. It is still too early to 
judge whether austerity  will prevail  or melt  down before the October elec- 
tions. The businessmen who last year hustled to fill Collor’s campaign coffer 
now grieve, moan, and whine. The trade unions are protesting the prospect of 
mass unemployment. Is Collor a populist? 
3.4  Populism, Poverty and Distribution 
Redistributive efforts based on government deficits and overvaluation will 
melt in an inflationary pyre. Despite ample experience from the past, this is a 
lesson that bears repeating. There is, however, an important distinction to be 
made between policies of  excessive spending  and programs  aimed  at over- 
coming poverty. 
Far from providing  an indictment  of  redistribution  efforts, the history of 
populism makes conspicuous the paucity of genuine redistribution  programs 
in  Latin  American (see tables 3.2 and 3.3).  Despite  compelling  criticism, 
2. Banks and financial institutions will be forced to buy privatization certificates Table 3.2  Economic and Social Indicators in Latin America’ 
Population 
GDP per  Urban Population  Life Expectancy  Infant Mortality  per Physician 
Capita Indexh  (% of total)  (Years)  (per thousand)  (in thousands)  Literacy Ratio 
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Sources: Summers and Heston (1984); World Bank, World Tables, IMF, International Financial Statistics, PREALC, and ECLAC. 
aLatin America except Cuba; countries are ordered by size of GDP per capita in  1980. 
hIndices of GDP per capita in 1980, Venezuela = 100. Venezuela GDP per capita = $3,310 in  1975 dollars. 
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d1970 
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Table 3.3  Percentage of Population Living under the Poverty Line in Latin 
America, 1970-86 















24.0  24.8 
65.0  68.2 
34.0  51 
39.0  53.9  41 
50.0  59 
25.0  37 
All 10 countries  39.0 
Sources: Altimir (1982); CEPAL (1989). 
‘The national averages of  Altimir’s poverty line vary between $162 for Honduras and $296 for 
Argentina (in 1970 dollars). 
bECLAC  direct estimates follow Altimir’s methodology. 
changing relative prices was the most common strategy of classical populism. 
The costs of this policy included significant leakages as well as large govern- 
ment and efficiency costs. Organized, vocal, and visible groups of the modem 
sector used their political power to press for increases in the minimum wage 
as well  as for food and transport subsidies.  Governments, held directly re- 
sponsible for the earnings of the workers in the modern sector, chose to im- 
pose losses on the rural and informal sectors because the administration would 
be less likely to be held accountable for such losses. 
Classical populists distributed the gains from growth among the politically 
enfranchised. Latin American reformism in the 1960s was based in the alli- 
ance between the national bourgeoisie, the middle classes, and urban work- 
ers, all aiming at the development of  an internal market. The favored groups 
were urban labor and the middle classes. Industrial workers gained union rec- 
ognition, electoral power,  and welfare benefits.  The middle classes received 
more public jobs, better educational facilities, and decision-making authority 
in  the bureaucracy.  Desarrollo hacia adentro involved  a pattern  of  growth 
based on higher levels of consumption by the urban population included in the 
pacto social. But strengthening the labor movement and increasing real wages 
soon would face its own limits. The pacto social supported policies that fa- 
vored the urban middle class at the expense of the rural population.  Thus its 
contradictory nature: the demand for increased food production by a growing 
urban population clashed with policies that channeled the bulk of  public in- 
vestment funds to industry. 
Regardless of  populists’ promises to “serve all the people,” some sectors 
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the urban sector, it barely touched the urban poor. As the cornerstone of  pop- 
ulist redistribution, minimum-wage increases  promoted  the welfare of  rela- 
tively small groups at the expense of larger groups. When effectively enforced 
(and often they were not) such laws made wages higher for those fortunate 
enough to get jobs in the modem, formal sector. They did little to overcome 
poverty.  The reasons are two.  First, low income groups do not receive the 
official minimum wage. Second, the evidence does not support the hypothesis 
that there is a positive correlation between the official minimum wage and the 
level of wages below it (see Almeida dos Reis 1989). 
In the urban areas, the poorest are self-employed  (rather than wage earn- 
ers), workers in construction (the most likely entry point for immigrants), and 
people working in public make-work programs such as those in Chile (World 
Bank  1986). Because the poor have larger families, the incidence of  poverty 
among children is higher than among  adult^.^ Programs that could have alle- 
viated urban poverty would  have  included  improved  access to birth control 
and prenatal care, nutrition and sanitation programs, childcare programs for 
working  mothers, and better  primary  school education. Classical  populists 
expanded the welfare state, but the emphasis was not on poverty. Broad-based 
social security programs and state support for universities served the middle 
class and absorbed resources that could have targeted the poor. 
The group most  seriously  neglected  by  populists-and  nonpopulists-is 
the rural poor. The extent of poverty is markedly higher in rural than in urban 
areas in all Latin American countries (Altimir 1982). Whereas 26 percent of 
urban  Latin  Americans were poor in  1970, 60 percent  of  rural  households 
were poor. Even in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, the most heavily urban- 
ized countries in the region, the extent of rural poverty was not less than 20 
percent of rural households. In Mexico, the poorest 30 percent of the popula- 
tion was almost entirely rural. In Brazil, 70 percent of  the lowest four deciles 
in the mid-1970s were rural households. In 1986, the extent of poverty contin- 
ued to be markedly higher in rural areas (table 3.4). 
Both peasants and landless labor comprise the rural poor, although the mix 
varies among countries. In Brazil, for example, the poorest are mainly  tem- 
porary  laborers, while in Peru, subsistence farmers dominate. In Colombia, 
about half of poor rural households are small producers, the rest landless la- 
bor. Landowners who are poor typically own too little land to subsist on and 
earn a large share of  their cash income as laborers on larger farms. 
Where land ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few and large es- 
tates are farmed carelessly, agrarian reform can promote economic growth and 
greater equity. But of the regimes that might be considered populist by econ- 
3. Selowsky (1982) and Altimir (1984) both estimate that the proportion of small children and 
school-age children in poverty is larger than the proportion of poor households; there are also 
more children in poverty among those belonging to households whose heads are female or have 
little education; Paes de Barros (1989) shows that in the metropolitan areas of  Brazil children in 
households headed by women are overrepresented among the poor. 63  Populism, Profligacy, and Redistribution 
Table 3.4  Percentage of Population Living in Poverty, 1986 
% of  Population 
below Poverty Line 
% of Population 
below Destitution Line 











60  80 
47  61 
36  52 
51  71 
21 
34  48 
3 
16 
73  31  57  49 
51  19  30  22 
41  16  28  20 
59  23  53  34 
37  11  22  13 
5 
Source: CEPAL (1989). 
’Metropolitan areas only. 
bFigures from Mexico are from 1984. 
‘Preliminary figures. 
omists, only a handful have implemented major agrarian reform: Velasco, Al- 
lende, and the Sandinistas. Democratic regimes fail to implement change for 
two reasons:  large landowners still influence government  and policymakers 
fear reform  will improve rural diets at the expense of output for urban food 
and export markets. Plagued by foreign exchange crisis and afraid to alienate 
urban workers who are sensitive to food prices, populists dragged their heels 
on land reform. For the most part, it has been the military and revolutionaries 
who have reformed land~wnership.~  The fact that military regimes have also 
reversed or prevented  land reform,  as in  Chile and Guatemala, reflects  the 
difficulty  of  achieving social consensus on rural  property  rights.  Table 3.5 
shows the impact of redistribution on rural households. 
Land reform has yielded both orderly transitions and chaotic disruptions of 
output  in Latin  America. The diversity of  experiences  reflects  considerable 
variation in the nature of redistribution  within the region.  New rights to land 
have taken the form of individual ownership, communally organized produc- 
tion, or the allocation  of lands to family farms on a semipermanent basis.  It 
also has involved distribution of unused public or private lands to new settlers, 
varying levels of  compensation for expropriation  and diverse degrees of  pro- 
tection for the nonreform sector. 
In Mexico and Bolivia, land reform  was relatively successful in pacifying 
the countryside and mitigating  rural poverty.  Peruvian  land reform failed in 
4. The Mexican revolution redistributed 43 percent of the country’s agricultural land, the Boliv- 
ian revolution shared out 83 percent of the land. The Peruvian military government redistributed 
40 percent of  the country’s farming area (see table 3.5). A more recent example of  radical reform 
is found in Nicaragua, following the overthrow in  1979 of  the Somoza dynasty. The Sandinista 
regime turned the Somoza family’s holdings, covering more than a fifth of the country’s arable 
land, into state farms and gave peasants access to idle land. 64  Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege 
Table 3.5  Latin American Agrarian Reforms 
Beneficiaries  B  of 
Year  as % of  Affected Forest  Organization 
Country  Modified  Householdsa  Surfaceh  Productionc 
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Sources: Deere (1985) and Thiesenhusen (1989). 
"Total  number of beneficiaries until the year in parentheses divided by number of rural households 
in that year. 
hAffected area as measured until year in parentheses. 
cSF = state farms; IH = individual holdings; CO = cooperatives. 
both economic and political terms. It not only failed to stimulate production 
and eradicate rural poverty but it did nothing to improve political stability. In 
part its failure can be blamed on the weaknesses of the reform program but 
mostly  it reflects Velasco's  economic policies. The cooperative model also 
contributed to the poor results. The large-scale cooperatives were met with 
opposition from the peasantry; imposed from above the cooperatives were 
perceived as a burden by those they were supposed to benefit. The Peruvian 
experience indicates that land reform is not sufficient for rural development 65  Populism, Profligacy, and Redistribution 
unless accompanied by  proper price, marketing, credit, and investment poli- 
cies. 
Three lessons stand out from past experiences. First, land reform has been 
most successful from an efficiency perspective when it has involved the take- 
over of inefficient haciendas or colonization of undeveloped land. There is not 
much sacrificed on this situation and peasants eager for land are quick to put 
it into use, The takeover of  commercial farms is most tricky: the transition 
period is damaging due to decapitalization and the existing managerial effi- 
ciency is difficult to duplicate. 
Second, redistribution of land does not help the most destitute. Land tends 
to be distributed to those who know how to work with the authorities or those 
who have been permanent workers on large estates. Temporary workers often 
find it harder to find employment after land reform. As a welfare measure, 
land reform needs to be accompanied by programs that target the very poor. 
Finally, land reform works best when it is accompanied by credit and tech- 
nical assistance from the government. It is not a cost-free solution to rural 
poverty. Governments can proclaim a change in ownership at little fiscal cost. 
But credit and technical assistance to help land reform succeed is expensive. 
Past experience has demonstrated that capitalization and market stability are 
important if small farmers are to participate in the modernization of agricul- 
ture. Without credit, adequate irrigation, transportation networks, and reli- 
able markets, access to a small piece of land may be only marginally better 
than the alternatives open to poor rural people. 
In short, a serious land reform program requires broad social acceptance of 
its inevitable costs. The consequences fall not only on large landowners but 
also on urban consumers who will face higher food prices (at least in the short 
run) and taxpayers who must be willing to support credit and technical assist- 
ance. Populists have generally not been willing to commit resources to land 
reform. 
Roughly 60 percent of  Latin America’s poorest people  still live in rural 
areas. Land reform may be the most effective tool in helping these people to 
survive, because it distributes assets that outlive government jobs programs 
and minimum wage fiats. Even under the best circumstances, however, land 
reform will not absorb Latin America’s rapidly growing rural population. A 
long-run solution to rural poverty must involve an expansion of job opportu- 
nities in the cities and targeted education programs that enable the poor to 
qualify for them. 
The need for genuine redistribution and economic growth in Latin America 
is acute. In  1984, Couriel reported that poverty affected more than half of the 
population in  Peru,  El  Salvador, Guatemala,  Honduras, Nicaragua,  Haiti, 
Ecuador, the Dominican Republic,  and Bolivia. The Comision Economica 
para America Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL 1989) shows that,  in 1986, more 
than 70 percent of the population of  Guatemala lived below the poverty line 
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Attempts  to accelerate growth  through government  deficits  fail, as  eco- 
nomic populism has amply demonstrated. Redistribution must carry the ball. 
Average income per capita in most Latin American countries exceeds that in 
African  and Asian countries, but extreme poverty persists as a result of in- 
equitable income distribution. Table 3.6 shows the distribution of  income in 
several Latin American countries. A social consensus to tax, to reduce subsi- 
dies to the middle class, and to finance poverty programs and land reform are 
critical to changing this picture. 
Economic stability contributes to the alleviation of  poverty. Urrutia (1985) 
uses the case of  Colombia to claim that  progress  can be achieved through 
prudent management:  “A  complete  analysis  of  all  existing  statistical  data 
shows that the income distribution did not worsen in the  1970s and that the 
real incomes of the poor improved significantly, especially in the later half of 
the decade.”  The Colombian eclectic  system used controls but avoided  the 
extreme protectionism  of  other Latin  American  countries;  its crawling peg 
kept the exchange rate at reasonable levels, and government avoided inflation- 
ary finance. By stimulating housing construction  and exports other than cof- 
fee,  Colombia  experienced  sustained  growth  and  avoided  the  spectacular 
crises found in other Latin American countries. 
According to Urrutia, wages of  agricultural workers increased faster than 
national  income,  while wages of  lower-income  urban  workers  grew faster 
than wages of higher-income urban workers and salaries of  white-collar em- 
Table 3.6  Income Shares and Gini Indices for 14 Latin American Countries, 
circa 1970 
Income Share of  Top 
20% as Multiple of 
Bottom 20%  Gini Index 






























































Sources: For cols. 1 and 3, Kakwani (1982). For cols. 2 and 4, Lecaillon et al. (1984) 67  Populism, Profligacy, and Redistribution 
ployees. Urrutia also argues that financial liberalization brought about better 
credit allocation, and that fiscal policy had a positive impact on income distri- 
bution. He suggests that the  1960s tax  system was slightly progressive and 
that the reforms of 1974-75  were a factor in improvement. The income of the 
first decile was twice as high after taxes and government transfers, while the 
income share of  the top decile was reduced. Education, health, and public 
services such as water, electricity, and  government programs benefited the 
poor in more than a proportional way.  Urrutia shows that between 1964 and 
1972 the overall distribution improved because of the narrowing rural-urban 
differential. London0 (1989) calculates an  8 percentage points reduction in 
Colombia’s Gini index between 1964 and 1988 (see table 3.7). 
Despite progress, inequality and poverty in Colombia remain acute. But its 
stable macroeconomic policies certainly did more for the poor than the oscil- 
lations observed in Brazil and Chile. In both cases there is evidence that reces- 
sions caused dramatic increases in the Gini coefficient. In Brazil, the coeffi- 
cient jumped from 0.5 in  1960 to 0.6 in 1970, an unusually large deterioration 
in only  10  years.  Fishlow  (1972) shows that  the stabilization policies that 
followed Goulart’s populism in 1964 were largely responsible for the widen- 
ing of  inequality. Chile also exhibits this extraordinary 10-point increase in 
the Gini coefficient in one decade (table 3.7). Two  extreme recessions cer- 
tainly played a role in this deterioration. 
No doubt, secular growth is a significant factor in reducing poverty, but its 
effects are relatively small and thus easily washed over by  greater earnings 
inequality and by cyclical conditions. Recessions have a disproportionate im- 
pact  on the poor and widen the distribution of  income. A recession causes 
more  unemployment,  a  drop  in  the  labor-force participation  and  slower 
growth of  real earnings. The costs of  continuing high inflation are not any 
smaller. Even where everything is indexed, including wages, prices, interest 
rates, taxes, and accounting systems, inflation has a profound impact on the 
lower classes whose subsistence is not protected. The inflation tax also falls 
more heavily on the poor classes who cannot benefit from indexed deposits 
accessible to those who can open accounts above a minimum floor. Stop-go 
policies hurt the poor. Stability might help them. 
3.5  Conclusion 
In Latin America, a variety of  different political agendas have led to eco- 
nomic crisis: 
Classical populists put too much stake on the possibility of demand-driven 
growth, inward-looking industrialization, and unrealistic expectations. Pe- 
r6n, Garcia, and Allende, to a large extent, failed to realize that Keynesian 
stimulus falters on foreign exchange constraints. 
Attempts at developing market-based socialism are also to blame for failed 
economic policy. Insecure property rights make it difficult to sustain private 68  Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege 
Table 3.7  Gini Indices for Brazil, Chile, and Colombia 
Year  Brazil  Chile  Colombia 
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. 
production, and socialist rhetoric triggers costly intervention by the United 
States. The Sandinistas may  have  been  overly  ambitious  in  their  initial 
plans  to  redistribute  and their  early budget  deficits  were  high,  but  their 
downfall  is more the result of Contra activity and uncertainty  about prop- 
erty rights than of  populism. 
Lack of  social cohesion and strong political parties make it difficult to im- 
pose  the burden  of  contractionary adjustment on  various  classes. Samey 
and Alfonsin could never decide how to distribute the burden of adjustment 
to the debt shock. As fragile elected regimes without strong political sup- 
port  of  any particular group, they  were  unable  to impose contraction  on 
anyone. The result was failure to live within the economy’s contraints and 
hyperinflation. 
Although  redistribution  marks  populism,  the  poorest  have  not  benefited 
from it. Classical populism redistributed  income from the agricultural and 
export sectors to capitalists and workers in the formal urban sector. Rural 
peasants  and  the urban  poor  remained  marginalized  both  politically  and 
economically. Modem populists did not serve them better. 
Minimum wages, the redistributive centerpiece of populism, are ineffective 
in overcoming poverty in Latin America. The poor are in the countryside and 
in the informal sectors where minimum wages are not enforced. Broad-based 
social security programs have also failed to concentrate resources on the poor. 
Solutions to poverty in Latin America lie in a concerted effort to tax and to 69  Populism, Profligacy, and Redistribution 
redistribute revenue to support agrarian reform and programs that aim specif- 
ically at the poor. This is only possible if the rest of  society accepts redistri- 
bution. Experiences with hyperinflation show that the politically enfranchised 
cannot agree on a distribution  of income  among themselves,  much less on 
distribution toward an increase in the share of the poor. 
Finally, whatever its root, budget deficit booms, however progressive they 
might  sound, hurt the poor. The lesson is that fiscal responsibility,  realistic 
exchange rates, and a stable environment are essential to sustain the basis on 
which to build a better income distribution. 
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Comment  William R. Cline 
I find myself in broad agreement with the paper by Cardoso and Helwege, and 
my comments primarily will seek to highlight and extend rather than refute. 
William R. Cline is senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics 71  Populism, Profligacy, and Redistribution 
The authors make an important point when they observe that populism is not 
the same thing  as either socialism or equity-oriented redistribution without 
departure  from private  ownership of  property.  Populism purports to  raise 
wages and benefit national capitalists without acknowledging trade-offs at the 
expense of  other  groups.  Its  redistribution is  toward  politically  powerful 
groups, not those in need, for example, toward organized labor, not the rural 
poor. A corresponding point that is crucial for this discussion is the authors’ 
correct observation that the failure of populism in Latin America should not 
be read as evidence that efforts to reduce income inequality are fatally in con- 
flict with economic stability and growth. 
I would also stress another point in the paper: inflation is regressive. The 
poor do not have financial instruments to defend themselves. The authors are 
correct in  indicating that stable growth is the best climate for improving the 
conditions of the poor. 
The experience reviewed in the paper does make one wonder whether there 
might not be a political inconsistency theorem for efficient redistributive poli- 
cies: by the time the political situation has become radicalized enough that the 
new leaders are prepared to take action seriously favoring the poor, the group 
in power has an ideology antagonistic to efficient economic structures. For 
example, radical land reformers reject the family farm as petty capitalist and 
insist on state farms, even though all the evidence suggests the latter will be 
less efficient because of poor incentives. 
Again on the political level, the shift in Brazil from Simonsen to Delfim I1 
exemplified an irony of populist pressures in military regimes. The pursuit of 
rapid growth at all costs was a consequence of the need to seek legitimacy for 
a politically illegitimate government. The paradox is that there may be better 
chances for stability under democratic rule. 
I agree with the critiques of import-substituting industrialization and would 
add the problem of monopoly in a closed economy resulting from the need for 
scale economies, as well as the loss of efficiency as the economy moves fur- 
ther from its comparative advantage. I generally concur with the criticism of 
Brazil’s move to intensified protection and import substitution after the 1974 
oil shock, although it should be kept in mind that Brazil’s present export ca- 
pacity in sectors such as steel is the consequence of investments made under 
that regime. 
With respect to adjustment in Brazil and Argentina in  1990, I would note 
that both programs sought to exempt the poor by freezing assets above thresh- 
olds that caught primarily the middle and upper classes. In both cases, the 
verdict on whether the poor actually escaped will depend on whether there is 
severe recession that causes unemployment and job losses and on the long- 
term growth effects of  damage to domestic financial institutions and trust in 
government obligations. I do think the Brazilian government may be more 
serious about fiscal adjustment than the paper implies; for example, the Collor 
administration  is  talking  about  dismissing over  300,000 government  em- 
ployees. 72  Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege 
The paper is correct in its conclusion that raising the minimum wage is an 
inefficient means of reducing inequality. Workers in agriculture often do not 
receive the minimum wage, so that increases can generate intralabor inequal- 
ity.  In Brazil, the new constitution  links pensions and social security to the 
minimum wage,  so that increases have a devastating effect on the fiscal bal- 
ance.  Incidentally,  the Cardoso-Helwege  conclusion on the minimum wage 
contradicts the Fishlow analysis of Brazilian income distribution in the late 
1960s  and early  1970s;  Fishlow  emphasizes  erosion  of  the real  minimum 
wage as a source of growing inequality. Cardoso and Helwege cite recession 
later in the 1970s as the source of rising inequality. However, the data are so 
shaky  that  trends  are questionable.  Moreover,  on the  basis  of  theory  one 
would not necessarily expect recession to concentrate relative income distri- 
bution, as profits are likely to be more procyclical than wages. 
Let me turn to elaborations of some of the themes in the paper. An implicit 
issue in this conference is whether income redistribution can be pursed with- 
out causing macroeconomic  destabilization.  I would remind everyone of the 
rather extensive literature on income distribution and growth in the 1970s. At 
that time the structuralists argued that, without redistribution of income, Latin 
America was doomed to stagnation for lack of an adequate domestic market. 
Related arguments held that basic goods had higher labor intensity and lower 
import content, so that redistribution would favor growth on these grounds as 
well.  In contrast, the orthodox view  had been that premature redistribution 
would jeopardize growth by reducing saving.  And empirical patterns  in the 
“Kuznets curve” seemed to suggest an inevitable concentration of income in 
the early stages of growth before eventual redistribution. 
Simulation analysis carried out by me and others found that the redistribu- 
tional issue was essentially neutral with respect to growth. Marginal savings 
propensities  did  not  differ  sharply  among  income  classes.  There was  no 
simple correlation between income elasticities of demand and labor or import 
intensity of basic versus luxury goods, and a large bloc of intermediate goods 
in the economy was necessary regardless of the composition of final demand. 
Such findings tended to leave the issue of income redistribution as a matter to 
be  addressed  on  its  own merits-neither  a precondition  for growth nor  an 
obstacle to it. 
Instead, attention turned by the late  1970s to a focus on absolute poverty 
and basic human needs.  The principal objective of distributional policy was 
increasingly  seen as a need to set a floor  to living standards rather than  to 
focus on relative income distribution. Researchers at the World Bank and else- 
where emphasized the importance of targeted government expenditure (e.g., 
on health,  infant and maternal nutrition,  rural potable water) as the efficient 
way to pursue equity-oriented  policies.  Unfortunately,  the debt crisis of  the 
1980s meant that attention had to be concentrated on survival of the economy 
as a whole, and for a time the distributional issue became a luxury that had to 
be postponed. 73  Populism, Profligacy, and Redistribution 
What are the lessons of  the populist record for policy formation in Latin 
America today? I think they are not only compelling, but that they have al- 
ready been learned by key political actors. Consider Carlos Andrks PCrez  in 
Venezuela. His past  policies might have led  to the expectation of  another 
round of  populism. Instead, his new government adopted strong adjustment 
measures. Or Carlos Menem in Argentina. A Peronist, his relatively orthodox 
austerity measures came as an even greater surprise to domestic and foreign 
observers.  In  Brazil,  Fernando Collor also embarked on  such nonpopulist 
measures as a wage freeze and cutback in government employment. 
Mexico provides perhaps the best model of this transition. In contrast to the 
populism of  Echevern’a  in the  1970s, the governments of  de la Madrid and 
Salinas Gortari have carried out massive and painful fiscal adjustment. Salinas 
has the right diagnosis: it is necessary to slim the state sector so that it can 
become stronger and focus its activities on the fundamental responsibilities of 
the state, that is, the social infrastructure. As Salinas puts it, in his travels to 
Mexican towns he frequently hears pleas for new sanitation projects or irriga- 
tion; he never hears demands for additional Boeing 747s for the state airline 
to facilitate travel to Paris. The new government’s budget reflects these prior- 
ities: even as it is privatizing airlines and the telephone system, the govern- 
ment is sharply increasing spending on education, health, school lunches, and 
other social areas after a long period of cutbacks for purposes of fiscal adjust- 
ment. 
Privatization is in fact a major feature of  the new  trend in Latin America 
toward economic realism. As one high official in  Brazil put it, the Brazilian 
state has some $200 billion in state firm assets and $180 billion in domestic 
and foreign public debt. Interest must be paid on the debt, but very little is 
earned in the way of dividends on the state firm assets. By reducing both sides 
of the balance sheet, the government can become much stronger fiscally. Even 
where state firms are not inefficient, privatization can help macro policy. In- 
comes policies often force the government to freeze the rates for utilities and 
other public services, causing them to lag behind inflation and provoke fiscal 
losses. Then, when the rates are increased, there is a new shock to inflationary 
expectations. Taking these services out of  the state sector helps depoliticize 
pricing policy. I note that privatization is largely absent in the recommenda- 
tions of the Cardoso-Helwege paper, but it would seem to be an essential part 
of successful adjustment and growth in many countries of Latin America. 
One negative side of privatization and state-sector adjustment does need to 
be highlighted. In the past,  many Latin American governments used  state- 
sector employment as the means of generating jobs for a rapidly growing labor 
force. Somehow the private sector will increasingly have to provide these em- 
ployment opportunities. The answer to this dilemma lies in part in the pros- 
pects for more rapid  and sustained growth, as adjustment to the debt crisis 
and, more fundamentally, restructuring of economies under more open, mod- 
em strategies lifts Latin America out of a decade of recession and stagnation. 74  Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege 
In sum, I would submit that the lesson from populist experiments in Latin 
America is not that governments must be hard-hearted, but that they should 
be hard-headed and soft-hearted instead of  soft-headed and soft-hearted (if 
populists were ever soft-hearted). The elements of  a successful strategy for 
growth with equity in the region must include: 
overall fiscal balance; 
the avoidance of unrealistic wage increases; 
concentration of  antipoverty action on government spending on  low-end 
social services, especially in rural areas; 
an open-trade model for efficiency and greater labor intensity; 
and firm anti-inflation programs, because inflation is the biggest enemy of 
the poor. 